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Phase one reviewed existing literature, data 
and evidence and identified the key factors 
related to separation, and the impact on public 
and council services. This report explores these 
issues in more detail: 
 
The cost of reduced spillover  
(Self-sufficiency) 
Self-sufficiency refers to the lack of spillover of 
public goods and public service provision to 
and from neighbouring authorities and the 
potential for over provision. We estimate that 
the Isle of Wight council needs to spend an 
additional 3% on public service provision as a 
result of being an Island.  
 
• 3% of the Isle of Wight council total 
services expenditure is over £6.4 million 
(Revenue Account Budget (RA): 2015-16 
data). 
 
• This is equivalent to two-thirds of the 
2016-2017 Budget Gap resulting from the 
Finance Settlement (Isle of Wight Council 
Medium Term Financial Plan). 
 
• Or equivalent to 4 times the amount of 
Rural Services Delivery Funding that North 
Yorkshire receives, or almost 4.5 times the 
amount received by Devon (Key 
Information for Local Authorities 2015-
2016). 
 
The cost of doing business on the Island 
(Island Premium) 
Among businesses currently operating on the 
Island there appears to be a common 
perception of unavoidable limits to achieving 
economies of scale or scope thus leading to 
stable but slow growth. Companies engaged 
with the local market are limited by the size of 
it; those engaged with external markets are 
limited by constraints in the input of 
production (mainly human capital). Relocation 
remains an option as an alternative to closure 
but businesses have also shown an emotional 
attachment to the Island and its human and 
social ecosystem. 
 
Among the businesses surveyed that are 
currently not operating on the Island, none 
have ever considered relocating on the Isle of 
Wight and only a few have considered 
expanding onto the Island. The size of the 
relevant market is not considered sufficient to 
justify a local office or indeed an operational 
facility. Furthermore, the infrastructure 
connectivity is a cause for concern if assessing 
a relocation or expansion on the Island. Whilst 
at very long distances the cost of shipping 
(monetary and time) to/from the Island 
represents a small component of the total 
shipping cost, at shorter distances it is seen as 
significant. 
 
Within the broader issue of skilled labour 
shortage felt in many sectors, the businesses 
feel they have an acceptable supply from their 
local area. Their knowledge of the business 
sector suggests that there are no hidden or 
untapped sources of skilled personnel on the 
Island; indeed they employ people who 
commute from the Island on a daily basis.  
 
 
The impact of industry changes  
(Dislocation) 
A 75% increase in the income from business 
rates payable on the Island (NNDR) is required 
to meet the estimated funding gap.  
 
Growing business rates by encouraging growth 
of low GVA sectors such as retail and tourism 
has a detrimental impact on the economy. We 
estimate that reducing the efficiency of firms 
by approximately 10% reduces domestic 
production of goods in (GDP) services and 





The three overarching Island issues of Self-sufficiency, Island premium and Dislocation presented and 
discussed in Phase 1 of this project are analysed further in this report: 
 
The cost of reduced spillover (Self-sufficiency) 
Self-sufficiency refers to the (lack of) spillover of public goods and public service provision to and from 
neighbouring authorities and the potential for over provision. Self-sufficiency costs occur where there 
is an obligation that a sufficient and proportionate service is provided on the Island. In this case it is 
not possible, or too costly, to share or access mainland services or facilitate cross-boundary 
arrangements for the provision of services that may be available to other authorities. Examples include 
the operational delivery of Fire and Rescue Service and the operational delivery of a number of 
services for children’s and adult social care. If a region like the Isle of Wight is detached from the 
mainland, its citizens cannot readily use public services provided by other local governments. As a 
consequence, the local government will either provide this service at a lower-than-efficient scale, or 
choose not to provide it. The magnitude of this issue to the Isle of Wight is calculated in the next 
section. 
 
The cost of doing business on the Island (Island Premium) 
The Island premium refers to the additional cost of conducting business on and with the Isle of Wight. 
For the provision of public services this may refer to the relatively higher prices that may be charged 
by contractors, or reflected in the price of goods and services delivered. This may reflect physical costs, 
such as additional transport costs, or the need to establish distribution infrastructures. Additionally, 
it will likely be influenced by the size of the market and the inherent potential for restricted 
competition. This is evidenced by surveying the advantages and disadvantages of operating a business 
on, or from, the Island. We discuss the issue with the business community to provide a comparison of 
firms on the Island and similar firms on the mainland.  
 
The impact of industry changes (Dislocation) 
Dislocation refers to the costs associated with the physical, and perceived, separation from the 
mainland. Dislocation has direct and indirect costs, and is closely tied to the underlying issues of the 
Island premium and Self-sufficiency. Often, driving up the growth of business rates collected by the 
local authorities is the simplest solution to suggest when an increase in public finance is required. The 
reality of this issue is often complicated by affecting other elements of the economy.  We simulate an 
economy to model the different scenarios, such as variations in population size or business numbers, 
required to achieve the economies of scale, to raise council tax and business rate receipts to offset 






The costs of reduced spillover 
We estimate that the Isle of Wight council needs to spend an additional 3% on 
public service provision as a result of being an island.  
 
• 3% of the Isle of Wight council total services expenditure is over £6.4 million (Revenue Account 
Budget (RA): 2015-16 data). 
 
• This is equivalent to two-thirds of the 2016-2017 Budget Gap resulting from LG Finance Settlement 
(Isle of Wight Council Medium Term Financial Plan). 
 
• Or equivalent to 4 times the amount of Rural Services Delivery Funding that North Yorkshire 
receives, or almost 4.5 times the amount received by Devon (Key Information for Local Authorities 
2015-2016). 
 
In this section, we summarise our analysis of the impact of being an island on public service provision. 
We develop a framework for quantifying the cost that a geographically separated municipality bears 
due to the lack of public goods spillovers from neighbouring municipalities. A full description of the 
analysis is appended to this report under the heading “No Man Is an Island: Quantifying the Cost of 
Foregone Public Goods Spillovers”. 
 
It is established in economic literature that there exists a relationship between public goods provision 
in neighbouring local governments. For instance, if local public goods are substitutes, then local 
governments benefit from their population being able to use public goods provided by neighbouring 
municipalities so that local expenditure for public goods will be lower when such expenditure is high 
in nearby municipalities. This has been shown empirically to be the case, for instance, by Solé-Ollé 
(2006) or Hanes (2002). This spillover of public goods provision is socially beneficial if each municipality 
by itself would be too small to provide these public goods at an efficient scale. 
 
The immediate effect of a small region's separation from neighbouring regions is that its citizens 
cannot easily use public goods provided by other local authorities. As a consequence, the local 
government will either provide this good at a lower-than-efficient scale, or choose not to provide it. 
Hence, this physical separation will result in higher costs of public goods provision or social welfare 
loss caused by its under provision. 
 
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps: In the first step, we use data from 151 English 
municipalities to estimate the impact of the areas’ own characteristics, its neighbours’ characteristics 
and public expenditure, and the distance to these neighbours on a municipalities’ own public 
expenditure. We find that municipalities spend less if public expenditure in neighbouring 
municipalities is high. However, our results also point at a cost of proximity to other municipalities: If 
neighbouring municipalities are more populous, public goods may become overcrowded, so that the 
local government will have to spend more on them. 
 
The second step is to use the estimation results from the first step to predict how much more or less 
the Isle of Wight would spend if it were connected to the mainland by traditional road and rail 
connections. We estimate the annual cost of foregone public goods spillover for the Isle of Wight 
amounts to about three percent of the Island's annual public spending. 
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The cost of doing business on the Island 
There appears a common perception of unavoidable limits to achieving 
economies of scale or scope thus leading to stable but slow growth on the Isle 
of Wight. 
 
Within the wider scope of our investigation, it was thought to be advantageous to probe a number of 
businesses based on the Isle of Wight to explore, identify and possibly quantify (albeit roughly) the 
direct costs involved with doing business with or on the Isle of Wight. 
 
Under terms of anonymity and confidentiality, telephone interviews were carried out with relevant 
Company Directors with the aim to address the following questions:  
(1) What are the advantages and disadvantages of operating on, or from, the Island?  
(2) Is it possible to clearly identify and quantify these, and  
(3) what would make the business seek relocation elsewhere? 
 
Most businesses are the result of long established operations which, perhaps after several changes of 
the shareholding and operational structure, developed into what they are today; to some extent a 
development by chance rather than by design. In some cases, the main benefit was reported to be the 
lower rent and land prices on the Island compared to the mainland. In all cases the availability of 
relatively stable personnel, with skillsets deemed to be suitable to support the re-purposing of the 
operations, was considered an advantage. 
 
The positive factor of counting on a stable and loyal workforce can also be interpreted as the result of 
a general lack of alternatives for personnel with sector specific skills. A relatively low level of the cost 
of labour was also seen as a positive factor in comparison to similar businesses operating in more 
competitive locations on the mainland. This, in turn, does not create opportunities of cross pollination 
between sectors, thus hampering further skills development and creation. 
 
Businesses on the Island are also aware that while high tech manufacturing, like the marine and 
aerospace sectors, undoubtedly enjoys the benefits of clustering, sector specific trends are global in 
nature and small/medium businesses in these sectors are trend takers rather than setters; still capable 
of producing growth but due to exogenous factors and at organic rather than nonlinear or disruptive 
rate. Some businesses lamented the lack of sectoral clustering but recognised that critical masses are 
missing and that investors would most probably look at more promising, less constrained and better 
connected areas.  
 
With regards to personnel, the lack of a suitable pool of potential workforce was highlighted: both in 
quantity and in quality; the lack of extended sectoral clusters limits the opportunities of career 
development and skills enrichment and development on the Island; this becomes a more critical issue 
for some managerial positions. Some smaller firms with less specific skills demands were happy to 
recruit from the local community and simply provide their own training. The alternative option is to 
recruit from outside the Island. A small number of medium size recruitment companies were 
interviewed to assess the difficulties in researching, recruiting and selecting personnel for a job post 
on the Island. Quite interestingly, none of the firms would accept ‘success fee’ projects; this is 
symptomatic of underlying difficulties in successfully completing such recruitment projects. Often, the 
hope for these firms is to attract a candidate who is originally from the Island and with a desire to 
return back there after a few years on the mainland. For some positions (often sale and field 
representatives) the Island’s companies are amenable to recruit personnel from the mainland offering 
the opportunity to work from home or from dedicated offices in the Southampton/Portsmouth area. 
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Salaries are in general lower on the Island when compared to similar positions in England and this 
creates an additional problem in attracting talent. Furthermore, wage trends on the mainland follow 
different and more competitive dynamics, hence raising the opportunity cost of relocating to the 
Island. 
 
In general, all respondents indicated the generic additional costs of travel for members of staff and 
visitors, and shipping of raw materials and goods to and from other destinations. The issues raised by 
previous reports were all confirmed and it might be worth updating those findings with current 
figures. Although these costs are well tracked for accounting purposes and represent a sizeable 
component of the business operating costs, they did not appear to be cause for special concern; a 
sense of resignation was perceived as a consequence of the unavoidable geography. It could be 
interesting to investigate to what extent isolation costs (higher movement costs) are compensated by 
isolation benefits (lower wages) so as to maintain the total cost to market level. 
 
None of the respondents have been able to monetise the cost and benefit of isolation; perhaps an 
additional symptom of resignation towards geography and demographics. 
 
When prompted to discuss the option of relocation elsewhere, the prevailing perception confirmed 
the feeling that current operational configurations are the result of chance rather than design and that 
relocation away from the Island constitutes often an item for anecdotal discussion rather than 
strategic analysis. A few respondents reported that relocation is always an agenda item at any periodic 
strategic review but the opportunity costs of it are thought to be too high and uncertain; a total 
replacement of the workforce, discontinuity of the operations and relocation costs would require the 
justification of a radical repurposing of the entire business and not simply of a more convenient 
postcode; the shareholders might even consider  the closure of the operations as the option next to 
their relocation. Political and economic uncertainty might have the effect of squeezing margins and 
might prompt shareholders to consider radical options, as consequence of general and pressing 
market conditions rather than of underlying geographical factors.   
 
In summary, there is a common perception of unavoidable limits to achieving economies of scale or 
scope thus leading to stable but slow growth. Companies engaged with the local market are limited 
by the size of it; those engaged with external markets are limited by constraints in the input of 
production (mainly human capital). Relocation remains an option as an alternative to closure but 
businesses have also shown an emotional attachment to the Island and its human and social 
ecosystem. 
 
Outside the scope of the project, the team was asked to run a short unstructured survey among a 
selection of businesses currently not operating on the IoW. 
 
The surveyed businesses cannot be considered a representative sample of the business community 
based on the mainland. 
 
The 11 surveyed businesses are: a major car dealer, a food and drinks distributor, a maker of cabinets 
for industrial purposes, a digital marketing agency, a recruitment agency, a maker of structures in 
composite material, a private school, a manufacturer of electrical components, a stockist of 
mechanical components, a distributor or marine equipment, a provider of language courses to non-





What follows are key issues identified during the brief survey. 
1. None of the above businesses have ever considered relocating on the IoW and only few have 
considered to expand on the IoW, beyond the current customer base (for those who have one 
there). 
2. Marketing activities are carried out online, at trade events and through visits to current and 
potential customers. The IoW is perceived to be simply too far to allow impromptu decisions 
to visit a site or a customer. 
3. The size of the relevant market on the IoW is not considered sufficient to justify a local office 
or indeed an operational facility. 
4. Within the broader issue of skills’ shortage felt in many sectors, they feel to have acceptable 
supply from their local area. Their knowledge of the business sector suggests that there are 
no hidden or untapped sources of skilled personnel on the IoW; indeed they employ people 
who commute from the IoW on a daily basis.  
5. Within one and a half hour commuting time (75 miles) from Southampton/Portsmouth, there 
are about 15.3 million people and tens of thousands of businesses, which could play their part 
as suppliers or customers. Within the same commuting time (20 miles) from Cowes, there are 
1.2 million people. As such, living just across the Solent would roughly multiply the market 
reach by a factor of 13. 
6. Infrastructure connectivity was mentioned as a cause for concern when assessing a relocation 
or expansion onto the IoW; whilst at very long distances the cost of shipping (monetary and 
time) to/from the island represents a small component of the total shipping cost, at shorter 
distances it is seen as significant. 
7. The language school never thought of opening an office on the IoW but had tried to organise 
language study holidays on the Island; their feedback is that their counterparts (other 




The impact of industry changes. 
Aiming to plug the funding gap solely with an increased level of expansion – via 
a larger council tax and/or business rate base - is simply not a viable option. 
 
At least 3,800 small business enterprise or 7,000 additional council tax band C 
properties would be required to fill the funding gap. 
 
This section investigates the impact on the economy of changes in industry type and labour size. Stage 
one focusses on the tax revenues collected locally by the Isle of Wight Council. Stage two takes a 
detailed view of how certain changes might impact the wider economy.   
 
Stage One: 
Calculation of the optimal number of businesses required and/or additional council taxpaying 
properties required to ‘balance the Council budget’. 
 
The Isle of Wight Council has an estimated funding gap of £35.13 million over the four years from 
2016/17 to 2019/20. To put this in context, the Council has a budget of £126.8m (£122.8m funding) 
for 2016/17. 
 
It has previously been estimated (The Isle of Wight Council Case for Fairer Funding, 2016) that to close 
the estimated funding gap (£35 million) through an increase in National Non Domestic Rates (NNDR) 
alone would require the income from business rates payable on the Island to increase by 75%. There 
are close to 6,600 business properties with a rateable value currently on the Island. If the make-up of 
the economy was to remain as it is, this equates to an additional 5,000 business properties.   
 
Given the average rateable value of a business property on the Isle of Wight is £4,800, the Island would 
require receipts from an additional 3,800 business enterprise to fill the funding gap. However, even 
just focusing on the upper-end of the NNDR receipts, this would require the equivalent to an additional 
17 superstores of a similar size as B&Q, Morrisons and Marks and Spencer in Newport. Alternatively, 
this would also be comparable to an additional 35 factory and premises equivalent to each of Vestas’, 
GKN’s and Gurit’s sites on the Island. 
 
Given the physical limitations of the geography, the restricted market size and the constrained pool 
of labour, such an increase is unlikely to be achievable by an influx of business relocations.  Neither is 
this likely to be met by expansion of the current cohort of enterprises on the Island. This is supported 
by the findings discussed in section 2 of this report. 
 
Similarly, an increase in council tax receipts alone would require receipts from the number of band C 
(the median) equivalent properties on the Island to increase by approximately 28,000 units over the 
four years (7,000 units paying for four years). To put this in context, the Isle of Wight has only 
experienced an average increase of 430 houses per annum over the last five years. Furthermore, the 
Island only has a dwelling stock of 68,000 (ONS, 2011) so this would equate to more than an additional 
10% of properties. Even if all new properties were at the highest council tax band (H) then this would 
still require some additional 3,250 properties. 
 
Furthermore, these are likely to be an under-estimation of the true increase in NNDR and/or additional 
properties actually required to plug the funding gap. First it assumes a 100% collection rate (currently 
around 98%), and does not take into consideration the actual cost of collection. Furthermore, it does 
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not take account of the potential change in costs likely to be incurred by the Council. While spare 
capacity would result in low or zero marginal cost and therefore a reduction in the average cost 
(economies of scale), if the Council is pushed beyond their current operational capacity then the 
average cost of provision will actually rise. Given the proportionally large increases of businesses and 
properties required then the latter is more likely.  
 
In other words, aiming to plug the funding gap solely with an increased level of expansion – via a larger 
council tax and/or business rate base - is simply not a viable option on such a geographically restrained 
island with the current levels of human capital. The next stage considers some scenarios where the 
number of businesses remains stable but their productivity is increased. 
 
Stage Two: 
This section assesses the impact of three scenarios on the economy using computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) modelling. A CGE model of the economy is designed to establish a numerical 
framework for empirical analysis and evaluation of economic policies (Hosoe, Gasawa& Hashimoto, 
2010).  
The three scenarios are as follows: 
 
1. Business demography changes to one with a larger proportion of high Gross Value Added 
(GVA) businesses (e.g. finance industry).  
2. Business demography changes to one with a larger proportion of low GVA businesses (e.g. 
tourism industry).  
3. Population continues to age, following current population projections. 
 
Results follow a brief description of the model framework. Modelling the economy is based on the 
allocation of resources and the trade-offs caused by scarcity. For example, this includes the decision 
by firms to export goods or sell them to the domestic consumers. Exports can earn currency which will 
support the desire to purchase imported goods. Imported and domestically supplied goods can be 
consumed by households or used as intermediate inputs by firms, where intermediate inputs 
contribute to further increase in output. Ultimately, the level (or changes in) household consumption 
determines society’s economic welfare.    
 
The main agents in an economy are the households, firms, and the Government. The information that 
allows interaction between these agents is price. The price mechanism solves the trade-off problem 
to find an efficient allocation of resources given constraints. Agents make decisions in order to 
optimise their private benefit based on prevailing price information taken from a market and a 
resource or budget constraint. 
 
Households maximise utility derived from consumption based on their budget constraint. The demand 
for goods are derived from the prices of goods and the household income. The demand for a good will 
increase if the price of the good falls or if the income rises. 
 
Firms maximise profits subject to technology constraints. The demand for labour, capital, and 
intermediate goods are derived from the prices for these factors and the revenue from selling the 
goods. The demand for factors will increase if the price of factors falls or if production of the goods 
increases. 
 
The Government collects taxes and consumer goods. Collecting household income tax, production tax, 




Households save some of their income, this contributes to the investment demand in the economy. 
Government savings and current account balance make up the rest of investment demand.  
Goods are imported into the economy from a foreign sector. Similarly, domestically produced goods 
are exported to the rest of the world. Imports are subject to tariffs, collected by the Government and 
are purchased at a world price based on an exchange rate between the domestic and world currency.  
 
Markets equilibrate by adjusting prices. Prices rise when demand exceeds supply and vice versa. The 
market clears if all produced goods by the firm are purchased by the household, the factor demand is 
equivalent to the endowment, and there is no gap between the supply and demand prices.  
 
The system of equations representing the above statements are solved simultaneously to obtain a 
general equilibrium of the economy.  National Input - Output data and Income Expenditure data, 
collected from the Office for National Statistics, are used to provide the detailed information for the 
above framework. These data represent an island economy in a single year, a snapshot of the economy 
from 2013 (the latest available data tables). Together, this data and the mathematical framework 
provide a numerical value of the economy wide impact of reforms that influence individuals sectors 
or agents. 
 
Based on projected changes in NNDR, council tax and costs to the Council, the impact of each of the 
scenarios on the Council budget are described below and represented in Table 1: 
 
1) An increase in the efficiency of firms by approximately 10%, leading to higher GVA  typical of the 
finance sector, has the following effects on the economy:  
There is an increase in social welfare, measured by household utility, by 2.5%. Domestic production of 
goods (GDP) in services and manufacturing industries rises by 3% and 2.4% respectively. Household 
income rises by 0.65%.  
 
2) A reduction in the efficiency of firms by approximately 10%, leading to lower GVA typical of the 
retail and tourism sector, has the following effects on the economy:   
There is a reduction in social welfare by 2.4%. Domestic production of goods (GDP) in services and 
manufacturing industries reduces by 3% and 2.4% respectively. Household income falls by 0.64%.  
 
3) An ageing population is equivalent to a reduction in the proportion of the population in the labour 
force. Therefore, a reduction in the working age population of 10% has the following impacts on 
the economy:  
Firstly, and most importantly, this reduces society welfare, measured by household utility, by 6.5%. 
Domestic production of goods (GDP) in services and manufacturing industries falls by 6.2% and 5.5% 
respectively. Household income falls by 7.8%. However, those in the labour force that are unemployed 
(seeking work) are more likely to find a work opportunity given the reduction in the labour supply. 










Effect: High GVA industry Low GVA industry Ageing population 
Population ↑ in long run Stable / ↓ in long run Demography change 
Labour force If IoW labour force was 
upskilled. 
However, short-
term, demand for labour 
met by in-migration. 
Supporting industries and 
services may employ 
current IoW labour force. 
Stable, but low paid 
employment of low-
skilled IoW workforce. 
However, would further 
lead to a ‘brain drain’ of 
high-skilled workforce. 
This type of work may 
suffer from seasonality – 
further reducing income. 
Reduced working age 




High GVA industries. 
These have the potential 
to sustain low GVA 
support services & 
industry, subject to 
capacity. 




Change in local market and 
consumer spending 
decisions due to ageing 
households. 
Island GDP ↑ ↓ ↓ 
Council tax 
receipts 
↑, potential increase in 
value and reduction in 
Local Council Tax Support. 
Stable / ↓ in long run if 
population decreases 
↓ if more Local Council Tax 
Support 
NNDR 
receipts ↑ potential ↓ Stable / ↓ in long run 
Council 
expenditure Increased expectation of provision of services e.g. 
education, leisure. 
Increased volume of 
support for low income 
households 
Increased volume of support 
for low income households, 
increased provision of adult 
social care likely. 
Other Potential overcrowding / 
encroachment of 
environmental areas. 
Likely increase in cost of 
living & housing for all 
Island residents. 
 
Household expenditure – 
quantity and types of 
products – varies with age. 
This is likely to change in the 
market provision of certain 
goods. 
 
These results depend on various limiting factors: 
·         The ability of the current Island resident workforce to meet the demand for labour. 
·         The ability of the Island to accommodate an increase in population. 




As a sensitivity analysis Table 2 shows the impact of a 10% reduction of working age population under 
normal circumstances and under high and low GVA industry make up, as modelled above..  
 






Domestic output (GDP) Services -9.0% -6.2% -3.4% 
Domestic output (GDP) Manufacturing -7.8% -5.5% -3.1% 
Household income -8.4% -7.8% -7.2% 
Welfare -8.9% -6.5% -4.2% 
 
In summary, an ageing population is more likely to be more detrimental to the Island residents and 
Council than a low productivity industry base.  
 
Furthermore, it is clear that increasing the productivity of the firms on the Island will result in the most 
positive outcomes for the Council and mitigate against some of the shock of an ageing population. 
Wealthier residents and more profitable industries would be better able to absorb a potential increase 
in council tax/NNDR. However, sustainable success of such a shock would depend on the available 
human capital of the resident labour force. If the demand for higher skills was not met by the local 
population then many of the proposed benefits would simply leave the Island. This course of action 
would also not be without potential externalities, such as the likely increase in cost of living and 
housing for all Island residents, regardless of whether they benefit from higher incomes from these 
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No Man Is an Island: Quantifying the Cost of
Foregone Public Goods Spillovers∗




We develop a framework for quantifying the cost that a geographically separated
municipality bears due to the lack of public goods spillovers from neighbouring mu-
nicipalities. Our approach uses parameter estimates from a countrywide estimation
of the determinants of local public expenditure to identify the extra local public
budget that a remote municipality would require in order to implement the same
level of public goods that it would exhibit if it was connected with its next neigh-
bours, ceteris paribus. We illustrate our approach by applying it to the case of the
Isle of Wight, which is located 5 miles off the south coast of England. We estimate
that the annual cost of foregone public goods spillover for the Isle of Wight amount
to about six percent of the island’s actual annual local public spending.
1 Introduction
Spillovers of locally provided public goods to neighbouring municipalities are prominently
assumed in many theories of public goods provision (Brainard and Dolbear (1967), Boskin
(1973), Etro (2006)). If local public goods are substitutes, then these spillovers imply
that local expenditure for public goods will be lower when such expenditure is high in
nearby municipalities. This has been shown empirically to be the case, for instance, by
Solé-Ollé (2006) or Hanes (2002). In other words, local governments benefit from their
population being able to use public goods provided by neighbouring municipalities. This
∗The authors gratefully acknowledge suggestions by Alan Collins, Renatas Kizys, David Pickernell,
Gianpiero Torrisi and seminar participants at the University of Agder. This project was funded by the
Isle of Wight Council as part of a consulting project.
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spillover of public goods provision is socially beneficial if each municipality by itself would
be too small as to provide these public goods at an efficient scale.
However, opportunities for spillover of public goods do not always exist: Neighbouring
municipalities may be separated from each other geographically by water or mountains
or politically by country borders on which trade barriers are imposed. In such a case,
the costs imposed on the local community by the lack of public goods spillover is an
important piece of information for political decisions such as the construction of bridges
or tunnels, or the establishments of regional economic hubs that span both sides of a
country border. The immediate effect of a small region’s separation from neighbouring
regions is that its citizens cannot use public goods provided by other local authorities,
or only at a significant cost. As a consequence, the local government will either provide
this good at a lower-than-efficient scale, or choose not to provide it. Hence, this physical
separation will result in higher costs of public goods provision or social welfare loss caused
by its underprovision. The aim of this paper is to develop a framework to quantify the
loss to such an isolated region resulting from the foregone public goods spillovers.
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps: In the first step, we use data from 151
English municipalities to estimate the impact of the municipalities own characteristics,
its neighbouring municipalities characteristics and public expenditure, and the distance
to these neighbouring municipalities on municipalities public expenditure. Consistent
with the above argument of substitutability of local public goods, municipalities spend
less if public expenditure in neighbouring municipalities is high. However, our results
also point at a cost of proximity to other municipalities: If neighbouring municipalities
are more populous, public goods may become overcrowded, so that the local government
will have to spend more on them. Hence, it is not a priori clear which of these effects will
dominate, i.e. whether being part of a contiguous area would make the geographically
separated municipality spend more or less than it actually does.
The second step is, therefore, to use the estimation results from the first step to pre-
dict how much more or less such a geographically separated municipality would spend
if it wasn’t separated. We use the Isle of Wight as a particular example for such a geo-
graphically separated municipality and predict how much it would spend on public goods
were it attached to the mainland by normal road and rail connections. Making plausi-
ble assumptions on the perceived distance to its next neighbours, we find that optimal
expenditure of the Isle of Wight would be about three percent less if it was connected
with the neighbouring municipalities by normal road and rail connections compared to
the actual geographical situation.
Finally, we will quantify the overall social loss for the Isle of Wight resulting from
being detached from the mainland. As noted above, a remote municipality may decide
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not to provide a certain goods or services at all rather than providing it at an inefficient
scale. As our analysis in the second step is only concerned with expenditure, it would not
capture such an effect, so that we would underestimate the impact on the Isle of Wight
when confining our analysis on that part only. Hence, we use a simple theoretical model
of decision making by local governments in order to show how the parameter estimate
of grants can be used to quantify the income effect on a municipality’s optimal public
goods provision. Using this effect and the previously obtained prediction of the impact
of remoteness on expenditure, we can then quantify how much more budget the Isle of
Wight would need such that its citizens can consume the same amount of private and
public goods as if it was part of the mainland.
Public expenditure spillovers have been analysed extensively in the literature, with
different results depending on the level of observations, the nature of local public expendi-
ture and the definition of neighbourliness. For instance, state governors have theoretically
been argued to be concerned about migration of the tax base and benefit claimants as
well as yardstick competition between state governments, all of which predict a positive
correlation between public expenditure in similar, not necessarily adjacent states, which
is confirmed by Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) and Baicker (2005).
Alternatively, expenditure spillovers may reflect public goods spillovers. Due to the
importance of geographical distance, studies that are concerned with this issue use
municipality-level data and spatial weights based on geographical distance. However,
whether the goods and services paid for with these expenditures are substitutes or com-
plements is an empirical question: For instance, Hanes (2002) for rescue services in
Sweden and Solé-Ollé (2006) for total spending in Spain have obtained results that are
consistent with local public goods being substitutes, whereas Murdoch, Rahmatian, and
Thayer (1993) for recreation expenditures in the Los Angeles region and Costa, Veiga,
and Portela (2015) for total spending in Portugal find a positive coefficient for spatially
lagged expenditure, which is in line with complementarity between local public goods.
We focus on local public goods spillovers and, therefore, use municipality-level data, and
find support for substitutability of local public goods. It will turn out that this substi-
tutability simplifies the theoretical model and, therefore, identifying the effect that we
are interested in.
As another line of related literature there is a number of policy papers on Pacific
Island Countries and the impact of their small scale and isolation on issues such as
public financial management (Haque, Knight, and Jayasuriya (2015)) or growth and
vulnerability to shocks (Becker (2012) and Tumbarello, Cabezon, and Wu (2013)). None
of these papers analyse the costs of forgone public goods spillover.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we use a well-known model of public
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expenditure spillovers to motivate the regression analysis and extend this model to de-
rive the impact of remoteness on public goods provision as a function of the parameter
estimates that are going to be obtained in the regression. Section 3 discusses the vari-
ables used in the regression and explains the construction of the spatial weight matrices.
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Theory of Public Expenditure Spillovers
Determinants of Regional Public Expenditure We will consider a slightly simpli-
fied version of the model in Solé-Ollé (2006) to analyse the impact of a municipality’s
characteristics on optimal local public expenditure. Let us suppose that social welfare
Vi(xi, zi) in municipality i is a quasi-concave function of per-capita public goods provision
zi and per-capita spending xi for a composite private good. Furthermore, the amount
of public goods zi that each citizen of municipality i has at her disposal is a function of
several characteristics of municipality i, including a linear, positive relationship with mu-
nicipality i’s per capita public goods expenditure ei. More specifically, let zi = Zi + εei,
where Zi denotes that part of zi that is invariant to ei (because it depends on other
characteristics of i).
Furthermore, assume that the per-capita income after central taxes, and including
grants from the central government, in municipality i is yi. Hence, i will choose ei so as











∂Vi(yi − e∗i , zi(e∗i ))
∂zi
= 0. (1)
Hence, the impact of a determinant ai of i’s public goods provision on the optimal choice



























as long as the composite private good is a normal good.
Following Solé-Ollé (2006), we shall also argue that zi depends on the municipality’s
characteristics in the following ways: Ceteris paribus, more public goods provision in a
neighbouring municipality and lower costs of the own and the neighbouring municipali-
ties’ public goods provisions will increase the public goods zi at municipality i’s citizens’
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disposal for given per capita expenditure ei by i and its neighbours. However, a larger
population in municipality i and a larger ratio of neighbouring municipalities’ to the own
municipality’s populations will overcrowd the public good and, thus, reduce a represen-
tative citizen’s consumption of it. For all of these characteristics, (3) implies that the
effect on ei will have the opposite sign than what we have just argued for zi.
It is important to note that the aforementioned assumption on how i’s expenditure
depends on public goods provision in neighbouring municipalities is implicitly based on an
assumption that public goods provided by i and its neighbours are substitutes, for which
the regressions in Section 4 will lend empirical support. Intuitively, we assume that public
goods spillovers just impact on the amount of public goods available for municipality i’s
citizens. However, complementarity between own and neighbours’ public goods would
require that public goods spillover increases the marginal benefit of own public goods
provision for a given level of own public goods provision. Hence, our approach cannot
be used for complementary public goods spillovers since we would erroneously interpret
the positive correlation between neighbouring municipalities’ expenditures that we would
observe in this case as negative externalities.
In addition to these characteristics that affect public goods consumption for given local
public expenditures, but not social welfare directly, there may also be characteristics bi












For instance, if bi represents a preference parameter that expresses the representative





, so that we expect this parameter’s impact on i’s equilibrium
expenditure to be positive. Alternatively, bi may represent the public budget of munici-
pality i. If both the public and the composite private good are normal, i will spend more
on both goods, which means that ei will increase.
To sum up, the theoretical analysis presented above suggests that several characteris-
tics of a municipality and spatial lags of some characteristics determine this municipality’s
choice of per capita expenditure. In Section 4, we will, therefore, estimate the following
equation
ei =α0 + α1
∑
j



















where Ni is municipality i’s population size, K = (kij) is a spatial weights matrix in which
kij = 0 if the distance dij between i and j is at least 50 miles, and kij = d
−1/2
ij otherwise,
and W = (wij) is the row standardised version of K. The shares ui of unemployed, mi
of non-EU migrants and ri of residents of rural areas in the population collectively serve
as proxies for cost of public goods provision. Furthermore, we will control for local tax
ti, per capita grants gi and wage income wagei to account for the municipality’s budget
constraint. Last, we include the spatial lags of the aforementioned proxies for costs of
public goods provision, unemployment, migration and urbanisation. This specification
follows Solé-Ollé (2006) to a large extent.
Quantifying Costs of Foregone Spillover We will now explore a way of identifying
the costs that an isolated municipality bears compared to a hypothetical case in which
it is connected with its next neighbours. Let d′ij denote the distance between i and j
in the hypothetical situation of contiguity that we are interested in. In our empirical
application, in which i is an island, even the ’actual’ distance dij is not straightforward
to determine: Unless there are road or railway bridges, a given distance to the mainland
will be significantly more costly and time consuming to travel than the same distance on
land. Furthermore, the spatial lags of per-capita variables in (5) are computed using a
row-standardaised spatial weights matrix, which is appropriate for the case of contiguous
regions but cannot account for remoteness.
We will tackle this issue by defining the i-th rows of K and W based on the hypo-
thetical distances d′ij and discounting them by a factor λ that accounts for the time and
costs that it takes to get from i to the mainland. Hence, our notion of remoteness is
similar to iceberg transportation costs known from the trade literature. If travelling from
the island i to the mainland costs more time and money than travelling 50 miles on the
mainland, the appropriate value for λ would be zero.
Hence, if Ai is the vector of spatial lags used in the estimation (5), based on the
hypothetical spatial weight matrices, and α the vector of estimated coefficients for these
spatial lags, the estimation of (5) predicts the impact of these spatial lags on i’s actual
local public expenditure to be λαAi. We will write e
o
i (·) to denote i’s optimal expenditure
choice as a function of this impact of the spatial lags. For instance, the actually observed
level of expenditure in i is equal to eoi (λAi).
We seek to identify the extra budget that i would need to provide the same level
of public goods that its residents would have at their disposal if i was connected with
its neighbours without compromising private goods consumption, i.e. the difference ẽ−
eoi (λAi), where ẽ is defined formally by
zi(ẽ, λAi) = zi(e
o
i (Ai), Ai). (6)
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The first step is to use the regression results to predict eoi (Ai), i.e. the per capita ex-
penditure that i would spend if it was connected to the mainland. Furthermore, we can
rewrite (6) so as to be able to use the parameters that we are going to estimate in the
empirical exercise: (6) is equivalent to
zi(ẽ, λAi) − zi(eoi (λAi), λAi) = zi(eoi (Ai), Ai) − zi(eoi (λAi), λAi). (7)
which, due to the fact that zi is linear in ei, is equivalent to





























The first summand on the right-hand side of (9) is the difference eoi (Ai) − eoi (λAi) =
αAi(1 − λ) between predicted optimal local public expenditure in the hypothetical sit-
uation that i is connected to its neighbours, and the actually observed local public ex-
penditure. This takes account of the ’indirect’ effect of connectedness on public goods
consumption via the change in optimal local public expenditure. Note that we expect
this to be negative since typically the benefit from neighbouring municipalities using each
others’ public goods outweighs potential costs of congestion due to scale effects. Hence,
the availability of more public goods spillover will induce i to spend less than it actually
does.
As we observe eoi (λAi) and have just argued that we can predict e
o
i (Ai) using our
regression results, it remains to identify the second summand on the right-hand side of
(9), which measures how connectedness directly impacts on public goods consumption
for given local public expenditure. This is potentially problematic since our estimation
will neither deliver the impact ε of local public expenditure nor that of the spatial lags
Ai on local public goods consumption directly. However, the following proposition shows
how these impacts can be obtained in a simple way from parameters that our estimation
does deliver.


















Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, removing municipality i’s physical separation is like reducing the price
for public goods, as i’s citizens can consume more public goods for given local public
expenditure. In this sense, Proposition 1 yields the total effect of this ’price reduction’
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on public goods consumption by disentangling it into a substitution effect and an income
effect: The cheaper availability of public goods due to the intensified spillover after the
removal of physical separation causes the municipality to substitute some private goods
consumption with more public goods consumption. However, its citizens will also feel
richer due to the cheaper availability of public goods. This income effect can be obtained
using the parameter for an exogenous change in i’s budget in the estimation of (5). In
the empirical exercise carried out in Section 4, we will use the parameter of government
grants in order to obtain the effect γ of such an exogenous budget change on optimal
local public expenditure.
With Proposition 1, (9) becomes




Recall that we have argued above that we expect αAi to be negative, so that the extra
amount of local budget that i would need to achieve the same levels of consumption as in
the hypothetical case where it is connected with the mainland is expected to be positive.
3 Data
Observations Our dataset is comprised of 151 English municipalities, each with an own
local public expenditure budget at its disposal. More specifically, these are all Unitary
Authorities,1 Shire Counties, London Boroughs and Metropolitan Districts in England.
Variables Table 1 presents an overview of all variables used in the empirical analysis
and their summary statistics. The dependent variable, Expenditure, is defined as the
difference between total local public expenditure and expenditure for fire and rescue and
police, since these areas are often provided in cooperation between two municipalities.
The source for these variables is 2015-16 Revenue Account Budget data provided by the
Department for Communities and Local Government.
Among the independent variables, there is a set of population-related variables, all
of which have been obtained from 2011 census of the Office for National Statistics: In
addition to the total population count this set includes the shares of non-EU migrants
and the rural population in total population, and a proxy for the local unemployment
rate which is calculated as the share of claimants for unemployment benefits in the total
population. Furthermore, wage income is defined as mean annual gross pay and obtained
1with the exception of the Isles of Scilly, which we excluded due to their extraordinarily small popu-
lation and, as a consequence, the fact that the claimant count data was not reported for confidentiality
reasons.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per Capita Expenditure (£1,000) 1.4683 0.7396 0.9705 10.0386
Population 362,808.0 273,096.5 8,760 1,524,719
Wage income 34,329.70 8,936.63 24,186 94,416
Unemployment 1.9225 0.8903 0.5 4.3
Non-EU migrants 0.0297 0.0383 0.0022 0.1411
Share of Rural in Total Population 17.3927 24.5068 0 100
Household Council Tax 1,193.92 166.93 379.16 1,502.79
Per Capita Grants 1.3620 0.5056 0.5965 5.3533
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Last, the average Band D equivalent
council tax per household and the total specific and special revenue grants and revenue
support figures used to calculate grants per capita are obtained from the Department for
Communities and Local Government.
Spatial Weights The spatial weights matrices are based on simple beeline distances
between the post codes of the municipalities’ townhalls. We use these distances dij to






ij , if 0 < dij ≤ 50;
0, otherwise.
(12)





For the municipalities in our dataset that are located on the English mainland, we simply
use these spatial weights. However, we have also an island municipality in our dataset,
the Isle of Wight. As discussed in the theoretical analysis, the beeline distance from an
island is usually much more costly and time consuming to travel than the same distance
on the mainland. Hence, it is important to create a realistic set of weights for the Isle of
Wight.
For the hypothetical case that the Isle of Wight was not separated from the mainland,
we will use the i-th rows of K and W as defined above using the beeline distances. In
order to account for the physical separation, we first calculate the ’perceived’ distance
from the Isle of Wight to the mainland, taking into account the higher costs of transport,
the lower speed of travel over water and the additional time required for boarding: For
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instance, the car ferry requires arrival at least 30 minutes before the scheduled sailing
time, whereas the means of transport has to be changed twice when travelling from some
train station on the Isle of Wight to another train station on the mainland. We define
the perceived distance as the distance that costs the same amount of money and time
to travel on land as it costs to travel from the Isle of Wight to the mainland, taking the
average of the time-based and the cost-based calculations. In Appendix B we compare
the time and money required for the cross-Solent travel to travelling on the mainland and
propose a perceived distance of 31.5 miles for a train journey and more than 69.6 miles
for a car journey.
In a next step, we use the actual width of the Solent (5 miles) to calculate the difference
d̃ between the perceived and the beeline distance between the Isle of Wight and the
mainland. When accounting for this difference in the weight matrices, the problem arises
that it would have little impact on the row standardised matrix W . Hence, we will
discount the Isle of Wight’s weights by a factor λ which is decreasing in the difference
between the perceived and the actual distance, does not change the weight matrices if
this distance is zero (i.e., λ = 1 in this case) and removes all spillovers from neighbours







. We will use the factor λ = 1− 26.5
50
= 0.47 based on the train journey in
the regression analysis and the quantification of the costs of foregone spillovers proposed
in equation (11). Furthermore, we will provide the same regressions and calculations
for the factor λ = 0, which is appropriate for a car journey, in Appendix C, and show
that our qualitative results are robust to the way in which the spatial weights matrix is
adjusted for the Isle of Wight.
4 Empirical Analysis
Table 2 presents the regressions that estimate municipalities’ expenditures. Following
Solé-Ollé (2006), we use the weight matrix K for the spatial lags of the population and
its square and the row standardized weight matrix W for all spatial lags of per capita
variables (and the spatially autocorrelated error term). Note that the Isle of Wight is
included in the regressions, but we have set all weights to λKi and λWi as explained in
Section 3.
The simple OLS estimation reported in Panel (1) suggests that higher public expendi-
ture in neighbouring municipalities induce a municipality to reduce its expenditure. This
is consistent with the aforementioned argument that some of the public goods provided
in the near proximity will spill over to citizens of a given municipality, so that this mu-
nicipality will reduce its own public expenditure in order to achieve the optimal mix of
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consumption of private and public goods. Similarly, a larger population in neighbouring
municipalities will make a municipality’s own public goods more congested and, thus,
induce it to spend more. Increases in council tax income or grants increase the budget
and, thus, imply an increase in public spending. In addition to that, Solé-Ollé (2006)
controls for personal income in order to close the budget constraint on the individual
level. For our units of observation, the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings provides
the wage income, the coefficient of which, however, turns out to be insignificant in our
estimation.
Last, the variables unemployment, non-EU migrants and share of rural population
are supposed to proxy for costs of public goods provision. Intuitively, larger costs force
the municipality to increase public goods expenditure for a given amount of public goods
provided. However, there is a countervailing effect that optimal public goods provision
will go down as a result of the cost increase. In this sense, our positive parameter of
the share of non-EU migrants indicates that the first effect may dominate, whereas the
effects seem to balance out for unemployment and the share of the rural population.
However, the OLS regression does not take into account that neighbouring municipal-
ities’ optimal expenditure choices will depend on the municipality’s own expenditure, so
that the spatial lags of the dependent variable are endogenous. Furthermore, the error
term of such a regression may be spatially autocorrelated. In order to account for these
problems, we use the generalised spatial two-stage least squares estimator developed by
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) in the remaining Panels of Table 2.
Panel (2) shows that the coefficient of the spatial lag of the dependent variable is
slightly lower than in the OLS regression. By and large, however, the effects are very
similar to the parameters obtained by OLS. For the regression displayed in Panel (3),
we added spatial lags of the cost-related variables. The idea is that higher costs for
neighbours to provide public goods will reduce their public goods provision, and thus the
spillover to a given municipality, for given public expenditure by neighbouring munici-
palities. Our significantly positive coefficients of the spatial lags of unemployment, and
the share of the rural population support this argument. Furthermore, observe that the
inclusion of these variables seems to remove the spatial autocorrelation of the error terms.
The other coefficients are, with the exception of the now significantly negative coefficient
of unemployment, almost identical to those in Panel (2).
Given our analysis in Section 2, it is straightforward to use these parameter estimates
to calculate the costs of geographical separation for a municipality. First, we predict
the impact of increasing the Isle of Wight’s spatial weights λKi and λWi to Ki and Wi,
respectively, which yields eoi (Ai) − eoi (λAi) = αAi(1 − λ) = 45.41 per capita in equation
(9). In other words, the Isle of Wight would spend £45.41 less per capita on public goods
11
Table 2: Local Public Expenditure in England.
OLS GS2SLS GS2SLS
Expenditure (spatial lag) -0.1484*** -0.1363** -0.1365**
(0.0539) (0.0631) (0.0574)
Population 0.0928 0.0840 0.0388
(0.1029) (0.0992) (0.0899)
Population2 0.0130 0.0242 0.0564
(0.0626) (0.0586) (0.0559)
Population (spatial lag) 0.0111*** 0.0110*** 0.0107***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Unemployment rate 0.0115 -0.0020 -0.0303**
(0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Non-EU migrants 0.6417** 0.6172** 0.6010**
(0.3145) (0.3086) (0.2904)
Rural 0.0010** 0.0008* 0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Grants 0.6098*** 0.6231*** 0.6665***
(0.0473) (0.0446) (0.0422)
Wage Income -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0012
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Household Council Tax 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment (spatial lag) 0.0725***
(0.0197)
Migrants (spatial lag) -0.8639
(0.6130)
Rural (spatial lag) 0.0029***
(0.0009)
Constant 0.3702*** 0.3839** 0.1990
(0.1317) (0.1495) (0.1345)
Spatially autocorrelated part 0.5470*** 0.2904
of error term (0.1993) (0.4409)
N 151 151 151
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels,
respectively. The population variable has been divided by one million for expositional reasons.
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if it was connected to the mainland, which is about 3.1% of its actual expenditure of
£1,484.87 per capita.
As argued earlier, this difference is just the optimal reaction of the local government
to gepgraphical separation but does not take into account the social costs of lower con-
sumption over all due to the ’income effect’. Hence, in line with the analysis in Section




to obtain the full effect of geo-
graphical separation, which is £90.75 per capita. Hence, we conclude that, according to
our measure of social costs, the Isle of Wight’s costs of geographical separation from the
mainland and, thus, lack of public goods spillover, is amounts to about 6.1% of its actual
public expenditure.
5 Conclusion
We have estimated a model of public expenditure spillovers using data from 151 English
municipalities and obtained parameter estimates that are consistent with spillovers of
local public goods that are substitutes for each other. Within a simple theoretical model
of spillover of substitutable public goods, we showed that the extra budget that a geo-
graphically separated municipality would need to provide the same level of public goods
as it would if it was not separated can be quantified using our parameter estimates. As
an illustration, we performed this exercise for the case of the Isle of Wight and found that
it would cost the Isle of Wight about six percent of its actual current public expenditure
to fund the level of public goods at its citizens’ disposal if public goods spillovers were
available.
Our proposed approach can yield valuable information for political decisions in a
number of scenarios beyond the case of the Isle of Wight used for illustrative purposes
in this paper: For instance, Norway has an abundance of islands separated from the
mainland, opposite banks of fjords separated from each other, or municipalities on both
sides of a steep mountain range, the Nordryggen. Similarly, some country borders form,
to some extent, barriers to economic interactions between municipalities on both sides
of these borders, the most extreme cases being borders that separate countries with
radically different political systems such as that between South and North Korea. In
these scenarios, the quantification of social costs of the lack of public goods spillover as
obtained by our approach can deliver two sets of insights: First, saving these costs of
separation would be an important benefit of investing in overcoming this separation by
building bridges or tunnels or by establishing free movement between countries. Second,
if such an investment is infeasible or impossible, this figure hints at what amount of
support a municipality needs from central government to guarantee fair funding across
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regions.
In line with the estimation results, our approach to quantify the cost of geographical
separation is based on the assumption that public goods provided in neighbouring mu-
nicipalities are substitutes to each other. This simplifies identification because we can
disregard the way in which public goods spillovers impact on marginal benefits of own
public goods provision. However, since this latter effect is crucial when public goods pro-
vided by neighbouring municipalities are complements, our approach cannot be readily
used for the case of complementarity. Furthermore, if the mix of public goods financed
by municipalities in our dataset include substitutes and complements, we are likely to
underestimate the cost of lack of public goods spillover. In this sense, we would see our
quantification as a conservative estimate for these costs.
Last, it needs to be emphasised that our analysis focuses on the social costs of a lack of
local public goods spillovers due to physical separation. However, physical separation is
likely to have an effect on many other relevant economic activities such as the consumption
of private goods or the flow of production factors between regions. These issues are beyond
the scope of this paper and need to be addressed within suitable frameworks such as a
computable general equilibrium model.
Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
The second total differential of Vi(·) is
Ω = ε2
∂2Vi(yi − e∗i , zi(e∗i ))
∂z2
− 2ε∂
2Vi(yi − e∗i , zi(e∗i ))
∂x∂z
+
∂2Vi(yi − e∗i , zi(e∗i ))
∂x2
(14)



































































B Calculation of the Isle of Wight’s Perceived Dis-
tance
In this Appendix, we calculate the ’perceived’ distance of the Isle of Wight from the
mainland.
For the case of a train journey, we compare the time and costs that it takes to get to
London from a train station on the Isle of Wight that is located in close proximity to the
shore (’Ryde Esplanade’), using the fast catamaran to cross the Solent, and the time and
costs that the same journey would take if it started at the first station in Portsmouth
(’Portsmouth Harbour’). The beeline distance between these stations is 5 miles. On
a typical working day, the first journey is scheduled to take 144 minutes, whereas the
latter only takes 94 minutes. Since the beeline distance between Portsmouth Harbour
and London Waterloo Station is about 65 miles, our measure for the ”perceived” distance
from the Isle of Wight to the mainland based on the travel time is about 65∗50/94 = 34.6
miles.
Where the extra cost are concerned, the first trip costs £47.20 one-way, whereas
exactly the same train from Portsmouth Harbour would cost £33.40. Based on this
measure, the perceived distance is 65 ∗ 13.8/33.4 = 26.9 miles. Taking the average of the
time-based and the cost-based measure yields a perceived distance equal to 31.5 miles.
For a car journey, we compare a journey from Ryde to Portsmouth and an equally
long and costly onward journey on the mainland. It takes about 10 minutes to get to the
Ferry terminal in Fishbourne, drivers are required to be there 30 minutes ahead of the
booked sailing, and the crossing itself takes about 40 minutes. 110 minutes by car will
take a traveller from Portsmouth, for instance, to Eastbourne (beeline = 61.5 miles) or
Poole (beeline = 39.1 miles). As for costs, a typical car ferry ticket for a normal passenger
car costs about £45. Using the HMRC approved mileage rate of £0.45, this amount of
money would get a traveller 100 miles on land by car. Hence, even the most conservative
estimate of the perceived distance as the average of the time-based and the cost-based
calculations would be (39.1 + 100)/2 = 69.6 miles.
C Empirical Analysis for λ = 0
Table 3 presents the estimation results if the spatial weights for the Isle of Wight are
multiplied by λ = 0 (instead of λ = 0.47 in the main regressions). The results are
qualitatively identical than in the main regression but the size of the negative public
expenditure spillover is smaller.
Just like in the main part of the paper, we use this estimation to predict how much less
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Table 3: Local Public Expenditure in England for λ = 0.
OLS GS2SLS GS2SLS
Expenditure (spatial lag) -0.1295** -0.1169** -0.1349***
(0.0534) (0.0585) (0.0519)
Population 0.0988 0.0883 0.0396
(0.1032) (0.0997) (0.0902)
Population2 0.0083 0.0207 0.0560
(0.0627) (0.0588) (0.0561)
Population (spatial lag) 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.0107***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Unemployment rate 0.0119 -0.0014 -0.0304**
(0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Non-EU migrants 0.6451** 0.6216** 0.5997**
(0.3120) (0.3066) (0.2910)
Rural 0.0010** 0.0008* 0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Grants 0.6054*** 0.6198*** 0.6664***
(0.0472) (0.0448) (0.0423)
Wage Income -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0012
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Household Council Tax 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment (spatial lag) 0.0728***
(0.0199)
Migrants (spatial lag) -0.8632
(0.6161)
Rural (spatial lag) 0.0029***
(0.0008)
Constant 0.3505*** 0.3603** 0.1961
(0.1310) (0.1450) (0.1279)
Spatially autocorrelated part 0.5357*** 0.2913
of error term (0.1939) (0.4418)
N 151 151 151
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels,
respectively.
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public expenditure the Isle of Wight would spend if it was connected with the mainland
(instead of total separation, which we assume in this Appendix to be the status quo) and




yields the result that the Isle of Wight would need an additional budget of £95.59 per
capita or 6.4% of its actual public expenditure for its citizens to dispose of the same
amount of public goods as in the hypothetical case that the Isle of Wight was connected
with the mainland.
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